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Abstract
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust
to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors.
In the process, we also initiate work on a new structural question concerning the stable match-
ing problem, namely finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two “nearby”
instances.
Our main algorithmic result is the following: We identify a polynomially large class of
errors, D, that can be introduced in a stable matching instance. Given an instance A of stable
matching, let B be the random variable that represents the instance that results after intro-
ducing one error from D, chosen via a given discrete probability distribution. The problem is
to find a stable matching for A that maximizes the probability of being stable for B as well.
Via new structural properties of the type described in the question stated above, we give a
combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for this problem.
We also show that the set of robust stable matchings for instance A, under probability
distribution p, forms a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings for A. We give an efficient
algorithm for finding a succinct representation for this set; this representation has the property
that any member of the set can be efficiently retrieved from it.
1 Introduction
Ever since its introduction in the seminal 1962 paper of Gale and Shapley [GS62], the stable
matching problem has been the subject of intense study from numerous different angles in many
fields, including computer science, mathematics, operations research, economics and game the-
ory, e.g., see the books [Knu97, GI89, Man13]. The very first matching-based market, namely
matching medical interns to hospitals, was built around this problem, e.g., see [GI89, Rot16].
Eventually, this led to an entire inter-disciplinary field, namely matching and market design
[Rot16]. The stable matching problem and market design were the subject of the 2012 Nobel
Prize in Economics, awarded to Roth and Shapley [RS12].
Another topic that has been extensively studied is the design of algorithms that produce robust
solutions, e.g., see the books [CE06, BTEGN09]. Yet, there is a paucity of results at the intersection
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of these two topics. Indeed, we are aware of only two works [ABG+16, ABF+17]; see Section 1.2
for a detailed description of these works. As explained there, their notion of robustness of a
stable matching solution is quite distinct from ours. Our first contribution is a combinatorial
polynomial time algorithm for finding a robust stable matching for a special case of allowable
errors in the input. Our second contribution is to initiate work on a new structural question,
namely finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two “nearby” instances of stable
matching.
We note that a particularly impressive aspect of the stable matching problem is its deep and pris-
tine combinatorial structure. This in turn has led to efficient algorithms for numerous questions
studied about this problem, e.g., see the books mentioned above. In studying the new structural
question, we have restricted ourselves to “nearby” instances which differ in only one agent’s
preference list. Clearly, this is only the tip of the iceberg as far as “nearby” instances go. More-
over, the structural results are so clean and extensive – see also our followup paper [MV18] – that
they are likely to find algorithmic applications beyond the problem of finding robust solutions.
In particular, with ever more interesting matching-based markets being designed and launched
on the Internet [Rot16], these new structural properties could find interesting applications and
are worth studying further.
We will introduce our version of the problem of finding robust stable matchings via the following
model: Alice has an instance A of the stable matching problem, over n boys and n girls, which
she sends it to Bob over a channel that can introduce errors. Let B denote the instance received by
Bob. Let D denote a polynomial sized domain from which errors are introduced by the channel;
we will assume that the channel introduces at most one error from D. We are also given the
discrete probability distribution, p over D, from which the channel picks one error. In addition,
Alice sends to Bob a matching, M, of her choice, that is stable for instance A. Since M consists of
only O(n) numbers of O(log n) bits each, as opposed to A which requires O(n2) numbers, Alice
is able to send it over an error-free channel. Now Alice wants to pick M in such a way that it is
stable for instance A and has the highest probability of being stable for the instance B received
by Bob. Hence she picks M from the set
argmax
N
{Prp[N is stable for instance B | N is stable for instance A]},
We will say that such a matching M is robust. We seek a polynomial time algorithm for finding
such a matching.
Clearly, the domain of errors, D, will have to be well chosen to solve this problem. A natural
set of errors is simple swaps, under which the positions of two adjacent boys in a girl’s list, or
two adjacent girls in a boy’s list, are interchanged. We will consider a generalization of this class
of errors, which we call upward shift. For a girl g, assume her preference list in instance A is
{. . . , b1, b2, . . . , bk, b, . . .}. Move up the position of b so g’s list becomes {. . . , b, b1, b2, . . . , bk, . . .},
and let B denote the resulting instance. Then we will say that B is obtained from A by an
upward shift. An analogous operation is defined on a boy b’s list. The domain D consists of all
such upward shifts on each boy’s and each girl’s list. Clearly, |D| is O(n3), i.e., it is polynomially
bounded. As will be clarified later, the operation of downward shift is much harder to deal with
and we leave it as an open problem; see the Remark at the end of Section 4. In the rest of the
paper, we will shorten “upward shift” to simply “shift”. Let us also clarify that we will deal with
the generalization of stable matching in which incomplete preference lists are allowed.
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We next study the set of robust stable matchings for instance A under probability distribution p.
We show that this set forms a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings for A and we give an
efficient algorithm for finding a succinct representation for this set. This representation has the
property that any member of the set can be efficiently retrieved from it.
Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 1. Given an instance A of the stable matching problem, with possibly incomplete preference lists,
and a probability distribution p over the domain D of errors defined above, there is an efficient algorithm
that finds:
• A robust stable matching for A.
• A partial order Π0 on O(n2) elements such that its closed sets are isomorphic to the set of robust
stable matching for A. The latter set forms a lattice L0 which is furthermore a sublattice of the lattice
LA of all stable matchings for A.
The main computational step of our algorithm is to find one max-flow in a network with O(n2) vertices,
where n is the number of agents of each sex in instance A.
1.1 Overview of results and technical ideas
Henceforth, we will assume that we are dealing with a stable matching instance with complete
preference lists; we will finally generalize to incomplete lists in Section 4.1.
Let us first summarize some well-known structural facts, e.g., see [GI89]. The set of stable
matchings of an instance form a distributive lattice: given two stable matchings M and M′,
their meet and join involve taking, for each boy, the optimal or pessimal choice, respectively. It
is easy to show that the resulting two matchings are also stable. The extreme matchings of this
lattice are called boy optimal and girl-optimal matchings. A deep notion about this lattice is that
of a rotation. A rotation, on an ordered list of k boy-girl pairs, when applied to a matching M
in which all these boy-girl pairs are matched to each other, matches each boy to the next girl on
the list, closing the list under rotation. The k pairs and the order among them are so chosen that
the resulting matching is also stable; moreover, a rotation on a subset of these k pairs, under any
ordering, leads to a matching that is not stable. Hence, a rotation can be viewed as a minimal
change to the current matching that results in a stable matching. Rotations help traverse the
lattice from the boy-optimal to the girl-optimal matching along all possible paths available.
Birkhoff’s [B+37] fundamental theorem for finite, distributive lattices shows that corresponding
to each such lattice, L, there is a partial order, say Π, such that the closed sets of Π are isomorphic
to the elements of Π. It turns out that for a lattice arising from a stable matching instance, the
partial order Π is defined on a set, say R, of rotations. Moreover, if S is a closed set of Π, then
starting in the lattice from the boy-optimal matching and applying the rotations in S in any order
consistent with a topological sort of Π, we will reach the stable matching corresponding to S.
Let A and B be two instances of stable matching over n boys and n girls, with sets of stable
matchings MA and MB, respectively, and lattices LA and LB, respectively. Then, it is easy to
see that the matchings in MA ∩MB form a sublattice in each of the two lattices. Next assume
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that instance B results from applying a shift operation, defined above, to instance A. Then, we
show that MAB = MA \MB is also a sublattice of LA (Theorem 2). We use this fact crucially
to show that there is at most one rotation, ρin, that leads from MA ∩MB to MAB and at most
one rotation, ρout that leads from MAB to MA ∩MB (Theorem 3). Moreover, we can obtain
efficiently this pair of rotations for each of the polynomially many instances that result from the
polynomially many shifts (Proposition 4).
Let ΠA be the partial order for the lattice of instance A. It is easy to see that a matching M ∈ MA,
corresponding to a closed set S of ΠA, is in MB iff whenever ρin ∈ S, ρout ∈ S.
In Section 4 we give an integer program whose optimal solution is a robust stable matching for
the given probability distribution on shifts. The IP has one indicator variable, yρ, corresponding
to each rotation ρ in ΠA. The constraints of the program ensure that the set S of rotations that
are set to 0 form a closed set. The rest of the constraints and the objective function ensure that
the corresponding matching minimizes the probability that M is in MA \MB. We obtain the
LP-relaxation of this IP and then obtain the dual LP. We interpret the latter as solving a maximum
circulation problem in a special network. This in turn is solvable as a max-flow problem on a
network having O(n2) vertices and the solution yields an integral optimal solution to the LP,
hence yielding an efficient combinatorial algorithm for finding a robust stable matching.
In Section 5, we next study the set of robust stable matchings for instance A under probability
distribution p. We show that this set forms a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings for A
(Lemma 13). We give an efficient algorithm for finding a succinct representation for this set. This
representation has the property that any member of the set can be efficiently retrieved from it
(Lemma 15).
1.2 Related work
Aziz. et. al. [ABG+16] considered the problem of finding stable matching under uncertain linear
preferences. They proposed three different uncertainty models:
1. Lottery Model: Each agent has a probability distribution over strict preference lists, inde-
pendent of other agents.
2. Compact Indifference Model: Each agent has a single weak preference list in which ties
may exist. All linear order extensions of this weak order have equal probability.
3. Joint Probability Model: A probability distribution over preference profiles is specified.
They showed that finding the matching with highest probability of begin stable is NP-hard for
the Compact Indifference Model and the Joint Probability Model. For the very special case
that preference lists of one gender are certain and the number of uncertain agents of the other
gender are bounded by a constant, they gave a polynomial time algorithm that works for all three
models.
The joint probability model is the most powerful and closest to our setting. The main difference
is that in their model, there is no base instance, called A in our model. The opportunity of finding
new structural results arises from our model precisely because we need to consider two “nearby”
instances, namely A and the instance B obtained by executing a shift.
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Aziz. et. al. [ABF+17] introduced a pairwise probability model in which each agent gives the
probability of preferring one agent over another for all possible pairs. They showed that the
problem of finding a matching with highest probability of being stable is NP-hard even when no
agent has a cycle in his/her certain preferences (i.e., the ones that hold with probability 1).
1.2.1 A matter of nomenclature
Assigning correct nomenclature to a new issue under investigation is clearly critical for ease of
comprehension. In this context we wish to mention that very recently, Genc et. al. [GSOS17]
defined the notion of an (a, b)-supermatch as follows: this is a stable matching in which if any a
pairs break up, then it is possible to match them all off by changing the partners of at most b other
pairs, so the resulting matching is also stable. They showed that it is NP-hard to decide if there is
an (a, b)-supermatch. They also gave a polynomial time algorithm for a very restricted version of
this problem, namely given a stable matching and a number b, decide if it is a (1, b)-supermatch.
Observe that since the given instance may have exponentially many stable matchings, this does
not yield a polynomial time algorithm even for deciding if there is a stable matching which is a
(1, b)-supermatch for a given b.
Genc. et. al. [GSSO17] also went on to defining the notion of the most robust stable matching,
namely a (1, b)-supermatch where b is minimum. We would like to point out that “robust”
is a misnomer in this situation and that the name “fault-tolerant” is more appropriate. In the
literature, the latter is used to describe a system which continues to operate even in the event of
failures and the former is used to describe a system which is able to cope with erroneous inputs,
e.g., see the following pages from Wikipedia [Wikb, Wika].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The stable matching problem
The stable matching problem with incomplete preference lists takes as input a set of n boys
B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} and a set of n girls G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn} and a bipartite graph G = (B,G, E),
where E is a set of edges connecting certain boys to certain girls. Each agent v has a preference
ranking the subset of opposite sex that are neighbors of v in G. If v cannot be paired to one of
the neighbors, it prefers remaining unpaired rather than getting paired to any of the rest of the
agents of opposite sex. The notation bi <g bj indicates that girl g strictly prefers bj to bi in her
preference list. Similarly, gi <b gj indicates that the boy b strictly prefers gj to gi in his list.
A matching M is a pairing of boys and girls so it is a maximum matching in G. Thus, if G is the
complete bipartite graph, M will be a perfect matching in it. For each pair bg ∈ M, b is called
the partner of g in M (or M-partner), denoted by pM(g), and vice versa. For a matching M, a
pair bg 6∈ M is said to be blocking if b and g prefer each other to their partners in M; note that b
and/or g need not be matched under M. Matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair w.r.t.
M.
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As stated in Section 1.1, from here on we will assume that G is a complete bipartite graph. Finally,
we will relax this assumption in Section 4 to derive the more general result.
2.2 The lattice of stable matchings
Let M and M′ be two stable matchings. We say that M dominates M′, denoted by M  M′, if
every boy weakly prefers his partner in M to M′ (he either has the same partner or prefers his
partner in M to M′). It is well known that the dominance partial order over the set of stable
matchings forms a distributive lattice [GI89], with meet and join defined as follows. The meet of
M and M′, M ∧M′, is defined to be the matching that results when each boy chooses his more
preferred partner from M and M′; it is easy to show that this matching is also stable. The join
of M and M′, M ∨M′, is defined to be the matching that results when each boy chooses his less
preferred partner from M and M′; this matching is also stable. These operations distribute, i.e.,
given three stable matchings M,M′,M′′,
M ∨ (M′ ∧M′′) = (M ∨M′) ∧ (M ∨M′′) and M ∧ (M′ ∨M′′) = (M ∧M′) ∨ (M ∧M′′).
It is easy to see that the lattice must contain a matching, M0, that dominates all others and a
matching Mz that is dominated by all others. M0 is called the boy-optimal matching, since in
it, each boy is matched to his most favorite girl among all stable matchings. This is also the
girl-pessimal matching. Similarly, Mz is the boy-pessimal or girl-optimal matching.
2.3 Rotations help traverse the lattice
A crucial ingredient needed to understand the structure of stable matchings is the notion of a
rotation, which was defined by Irving [Irv85] and studied in detail in [IL86]. A rotation takes r
matched pairs in a fixed order, say {b0g0, b1g1, . . . , br−1gr−1} and “cyclically” changes the mates of
these 2r agents, as defined below, to arrive at another stable matching. Furthermore, it represents
a minimal set of pairings with this property, i.e, if a cyclic change is applied on any subset of
these r pairs, with any ordering, then the resulting matching has a blocking pair and is not
stable. After rotation, the boys’ mates weakly worsen and the girls’ mates weakly improve. One
can traverse from M0 to Mz by applying a suitable sequence of rotations, given by any topological
sort of the rotation poset (defined below).
Let M be a stable matching. For a boy b let sM(b) denote the first girl g on b’s list such that
g strictly prefers b to her M-partner. Let nextM(b) denote the partner in M of girl sM(b). A
rotation ρ exposed in M is an ordered list of pairs {b0g0, b1g1, . . . , br−1gr−1} such that for each i,
0 ≤ i ≤ r− 1, bi+1 is nextM(bi), where i+ 1 is taken modulo r. In this paper, we assume that the
subscript is taken modulo r whenever we mention a rotation. Notice that a rotation is cyclic and
the sequence of pairs can be rotated. M/ρ is defined to be a matching in which each boy not in
a pair of ρ stays matched to the same girl and each boy bi in ρ is matched to gi+1 = sM(bi). It can
be proven that M/ρ is also a stable matching. The transformation from M to M/ρ is called the
elimination of ρ from M.
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Let ρ = {b0g0, b1g1, . . . , br−1gr−1} be a rotation. For 0 ≤ i ≤ r− 1, we say that ρ moves bi from gi to
gi+1, and moves gi from bi to bi−1. If g is either gi or is strictly between gi and gi+1 in bi’s list, then
we say that ρ moves bi below g. Similarly, ρ moves gi above b if b is bi or between bi and bi−1 in gi’s
list.
2.4 The rotation poset
Let A be an instance of stable matching problem and let LA be the lattice of its stable matchings.
Corresponding to lattice LA, there is a partial order Π such that the closed subsets of Π are in
one-to-one correspondence with the matchings in LA; a closed subset is a subset of the poset such
that if an element is in the subset then all of its predecessors are also included. Since lattice
LA arises from a stable matching instance, it turns out that Π is defined over a set of rotations.
This partial order on rotations is called rotation poset. Given a closed subset C, the corresponding
matching M is found by eliminating the rotations starting from M0 according to the topological
ordering of the elements in the subset. We say that C generates M. Let C1,C2 be closed subset
generating M1 and M2. Then C1∪C2, C1∩C2 are closed subsets generating M1∨M2 and M1∧M2
respectively.
Lemma 1 ([GI89], Lemma 3.2.1). For any boy b and girl g, there is at most one rotation that moves b to
g, b below g, or g above b. Moreover, if ρ1 moves b to g and ρ2 moves b from g then ρ1 ≺ ρ2.
Lemma 2 ([GI89], Lemma 3.3.2). Π contains O(n2) rotations and can be computed in polynomial time.
Lemma 3 ([GI89], Theorem 2.5.4). Every rotation appears exactly once in any sequence of elimination
from M0 to Mz.
3 Structural Results
3.1 The stable matchings inMAB form a sublattice of LA
Let MA and MB be the sets of all stable matchings under instance A and B respectively. Let
MAB = MA \MB. In other words,MAB is the set of stable matchings in A that become unstable
in B. In this section we show that MAB forms a lattice. We first prove a simple observation.
Lemma 4. Let M ∈ MAB. The only blocking pair of M under instance B is bg.
Proof. Since M 6∈ MB, there must be a blocking pair xy 6∈ M under B. Assume xy is not bg,
we will show that xy must also be a blocking pair in A. Let y′ be the partner of x and x′ be the
partner of y in M. Since xy is a blocking pair in B, x >By x
′ and y >Bx y
′. The preference list of x
remain unchanged from A to B, so y >Ax y
′. Next, we consider two cases:
• If y is not g, the preference list of y does not change. Therefore, x >Ay x
′, and hence, xy is
also a blocking pair in A.
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• If y is g, for all pairs x, x′ such that x >By x
′ and x 6= b, we also have x >Ay x
′. Therefore, xy
is a blocking pair in A.
This contradicts the fact that M is stable under A.
Recall that b1 ≥g b2 ≥g . . . ≥g bk are k boys right above b in g’s list such that the position of b is
shifted up to be above b1 in B. From Lemma 4, we can then characterize the setMAB.
Lemma 5. MAB is the set of all stable matchings in A that match g to a partner between b1 and bk in g’s
list, and match b to a partner below g in b’s list.
Proof. Assume M is a stable matching in A that contains big for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and bg
′ such that
g >b g
′. In B, g prefers b to bi, and hence bg is a blocking pair. Therefore, M is not stable under
B and M ∈ MAB.
To prove the other direction, let M be a matching in MAB. By Lemma 4, bg is the only blocking
pair of M in B. For that to happen, pM(b) <
B
b g and pM(g) <
B
g b. We will show that pM(g) = bi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Assume not, then pM(g) <
B
g bk, and hence, pM(g) <
A
g b. Therefore, bg is a blocking
pair in A, which is a contradiction.
Let LA be the boy-optimal lattice formed by MA.
Theorem 2. The setMAB forms a sublattice of LA.
Proof. Assume MAB is not empty. Let M1 and M2 be two matchings in MAB. By Lemma 5,
M1 and M2 both match g to a partner between b1 and bk in g’s list, and match b to a partner
below g in b’s list. Since M1 ∧ M2 is the matching resulting from having each boy choose the
more preferred partner and each girl choose the least preferred partner, M1 ∧M2 also belongs to
the set characterized by Lemma 5. A similar argument can be applied to the case of M1 ∨ M2.
ThereforeMAB forms a sublattice of LA.
We will denote the lattice formed by MAB as LAB.
3.2 Rotations going into and out of the sublattice LAB
Let M be a stable matching in MA and ρ be a rotation exposed in M with respect to instance A.
If M 6∈ S and M/ρ ∈ S for a set S of stable matchings, we say that ρ goes into S . Similarly, if
M ∈ S and M/ρ 6∈ S , we say that ρ goes out of S. Let the set of all rotations going into S and out
of S be IS and OS , respectively.
Let {bi1 , . . . bil} be the set of possible partners of g in any stable matching in MAB, where 1 ≤
i1 ≤ . . . ≤ il ≤ k. Let ρ1 be a rotation moving g to bil , ρ2 be the rotation moving b below g and ρ3
be a rotation moving g from bi1 (see 2.3 for definitions). Note that each of ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 might not
exist.
Lemma 6. IMAB can only contain ρ1, ρ2. OMAB can only contain ρ3.
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Proof. Consider a rotation ρ ∈ IMAB . There exists M ∈ MA \MAB such that M/ρ ∈ MAB. By
Lemma 5, M/ρ matches g to a partner between b1 and bk in g’s list, and matches b to a partner
below g in b’s list. Moreover, M either does not contain big for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, or contains bg
′
where g′ ≥b g, or both. If M does not contain big for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then ρ = ρ1. If M contains
bg′ where g′ ≥b g, then ρ = ρ2.
Consider a rotation ρ ∈ OMAB . There exists M ∈ MAB such that M/ρ ∈ MA \MAB. Again, by
Lemma 5, M contains big for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and bg
′ where g′ <b g. Since M dominates M/ρ in the
boy optimal lattice, b must prefer g′ to his partner in M/ρ. Hence, M/ρ matches b to a partner
below g in b’s list. Therefore, M/ρ must not contain big for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It follows that ρ must
be ρ3.
Lemma 7. If both ρ1 and ρ2 exist then ρ1  ρ2.
Proof. Assume that ρ1 6= ρ2 and there exists a sequence of rotation eliminations, from M0 to a
stable matching M in which ρ2 is exposed, that does not contain ρ1. Since ρ2 moves b below g, g
is matched a partner higher than b in her list in M/ρ2. Therefore, the partner can only be bil or a
boy higher than bil in g’s list.
Consider any sequence of rotation eliminations from M/ρ to Mz. In the sequence, the position
of g’s partner can only go higher in her list. Therefore, ρ1 cannot be exposed in any matching
in the sequence. It follows that ρ1 is not exposed in a sequence of eliminations from M0 to Mz,
which is a contradiction by Lemma 3.
Theorem 3. There is at most one rotation in IMAB and at most one rotation in OMAB . Moreover, the
rotation in IMAB must be either ρ1 or ρ2, and the rotation in OMAB must be ρ3.
Proof. By Lemma 6, IMAB can contain at most 2 rotations, namely ρ1 and ρ2 if they are distinct.
By Lemma 7, if both of them exist, ρ1  ρ2. Hence, IMAB can contain at most one rotation, and it
is either ρ1 or ρ2.
Again, by Lemma 6, OMAB can contain at most one rotation, namely ρ3 if it exists.
By Theorem 3, there is at most one rotation ρin coming into MAB and at most one rotation ρout
coming out of MAB.
Proposition 4. ρin and ρout can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Since we can compute ΠA efficiently according to Lemma 2, each of ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 can be
computed efficiently.
First we can check possible partners of b and g with respect to instance A. By Lemma 5,MAB is
empty if none of the possible partners of g is between b1 and bk in g’s list or none of the partners
of b is below g in b’s list. It follows that both ρin and ρout do not exist. Hence we may assume
that such a case does not happen.
Suppose ρ2 exists. If ρ3 exists and ρ3  ρ2, MAB = ∅. Otherwise, ρin = ρ2, and ρout = ρ3 if ρ3
exists.
9
Suppose ρ2 does not exist. If ρ1 exists, ρin = ρ1. If ρ3 exists, ρout = ρ3.
Lemma 8. Let M be a matching inMAB and S be the corresponding closed subset in ΠA. If ρ1 exists, S
must contain ρ1. If ρ2 exists, S must contain ρ2. If ρ3 exists, S must not contain ρ3.
Proof. If ρ1 exists, M0 does not contain big for any i ∈ [1, k]. Since M ∈ MAB, by Lemma 5 M
matches g to a boy between b1 and bk in her list. The set of rotations eliminated from M0 to M
must include ρ1.
If ρ2 exists, b can not be below g in M0. Since b is below g in M, by Lemma 5 the set of rotations
eliminated from M0 to M must include ρ2.
Assume that ρ3 exists and S contains ρ3. Since ρ3 moves g up from bi1 , M can not contain big for
any i ∈ [1, k]. This is a contradiction.
3.3 The rotation poset for the sublattice LAB
From the previous section we know that LAB is a sublattice of LA. In this section we give the
rotation poset that generates all stable matchings in this sublattice.
We may assume that MAB 6= ∅. If ρin exists, let Πin = {ρ ∈ ΠA : ρ  ρin} and Mboy be the
matching generated by Πin. Otherwise, let Mboy = M0. Similarly, let Mgirl be the matching
generated by ΠA \ Πout, where Πout = {ρ ∈ ΠA : ρ  ρout}, if ρout exists, and Mgirl = Mz
otherwise.
Lemma 9. Mboy is the boy-optimal matching inMAB, and Mgirl is the girl-optimal matching inMAB.
Proof. Let M be a matching in MAB generated by a closed subset S ⊆ ΠA. By Lemma 8, if ρin
exists, S must contain ρin. Since Πin is the minimum set containing ρin, Πin ⊆ S. Therefore,
Mboy  M.
To prove that M  Mgirl, we show S ⊆ ΠA \Πout. Assume otherwise, then there exists a rotation
ρ ∈ S such that ρ 6∈ ΠA \Πout. It follows that ρ ∈ Πout, and hence ρ  ρout. Since S contains ρ
and S is a closed subset, S must also contain ρout. This is a contradiction by Lemma 8.
Theorem 5. ΠAB = ΠA \ (Πin ∪Πout) is the rotation poset generating LAB.
Proof. Let M be a matching in MAB generated by a closed subset S ⊆ ΠA. Let S
′ = S \ Πin.
We show that S′ is a closed subset of ΠAB and eliminating the rotations in S
′ starting from Mboy
according to the topological ordering of the elements gives M.
First S′ ∩Πin = ∅ trivially. Since M ∈ MAB, S does not contain ρout by Lemma 8. Therefore, S
′
does not contain ρout, and S
′ ∩Πout = ∅. It follows that S′ is a closed subset of ΠAB.
Next observe that we can eliminate rotations in S from M0 by eliminating rotations in Πin first
and then eliminating rotations in S \Πin. This can be done because Πin is a closed subset of ΠA.
Since Πin generates M, the lemma follows.
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Finally, we observe that the results stated above also follow when we make an upward shift in a
boy’s list.
Lemma 10. Let A be an instance of stable matching, and B be another instance obtained by introducing a
shift in the list of a boy in instance A. Then there is at most one rotation, ρin, that leads from MA ∩MB
toMAB and at most one rotation, ρout that leads from MAB toMA ∩MB.
Proof. Let us switch the roles of boys and girls, and reverse all partial orders in MA and ΠA.
Let MA and ΠA be the resulting matching lattice and rotation poset. Let ρin, ρout ∈ ΠA be the
rotations leading from MA ∩MB to MAB and from MAB to MA ∩MB in the this lattice, as
guaranteed by Theorem 3. Then ρin = ρout and ρout = ρin.
4 Efficient Algorithm for Finding a Robust Stable Matching
As stated in Section 1, let D be the domain of all possible shifts applied to each boy’s list and
each girl’s list in instance A and let p be a discrete probability distribution on D. Pick one shift
from D under p and let C be the random variable denoting the resulting instance. As defined in
Section 1, a robust stable matching is a stable matching M ∈ MA that minimizes the probability
that M ∈ MAC.
For a particular choice of shift from D, let B denote the resulting stable matching instance and let
ρBin and ρ
B
out denote the rotations going intoMAB and out ofMAB, respectively. By Proposition 4,
ρBin and ρ
B
out can be computed efficiently for each such B. For convenience, we will name the
chosen shift also as B.
By Lemma 2, ΠA can be computed in polynomial time. We add two additional vertices to ΠA,
a source s preceding all other vertices and a sink t succeeding all other vertices. For a shift B,
we may ignore the cases where neither ρBin nor ρ
B
out exist. In that case, either MA = MB or
MA ∩MB = ∅. Hence, we may assume thatMAB is always a proper non-empty subset ofMA.
For a shift B such that ρBin does not exist, let ρ
B
in = s. Similarly, for a shift B such that ρ
B
out does
not exist, let ρBout = t.
Let H be the Hasse diagram of ΠA ∪ {s, t}, defined as follows: The Hasse diagram of a poset is
a directed graph with a vertex for each element in poset, and an edge from x to y if x ≺ y and
there is no z such that x ≺ z ≺ y. In other words, all precedence relations implied by transitivity
are suppressed.
For each B, let eB = (ρ
B
out, ρ
B
in) and F = {eB|B ∈ D}. The integer program is as follows:
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min ∑
B
xBpB
s.t. yu − yv ≤ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E(H)
yt = 1, ys = 0
xB ≥ yu − yv ∀(u, v) = eB ∈ F
xB ≥ 0 ∀B
yv ∈ {0, 1} ∀v ∈ H.
(IP)
Lemma 11. An optimal solution to (IP) gives a robust stable matching.
Proof. Let S = {ρ : yv = 0}. The set of constraints:
yu ≤ yv ∀(u, v) ∈ E(H)
guarantees that S is a closed subset.
Notice that xB = 1 if and only if yρBout = 1 and yρBin
= 0. This, in turn, happens if and only if the
matching generated by S is in MAB. Therefore, by minimizing ∑B xBpB, we can find a closed
subset that generates a robust stable matching.
Next, consider the LP-relaxation of this IP:
min ∑
B
xBpB
s.t. yu − yv ≤ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E(H)
yt − ys = 1
xB ≥ yu − yv ∀eB = (u, v) ∈ F
xB ≥ 0 ∀B
(LP)
Define fuv, fst and guv to be the dual variables corresponding to the first three constraints of (LP).
Then its dual is:
max fst
s.t. ∑
v:(v,u)∈E(H)
fvu + ∑
v:(v,u)∈F
gvu = ∑
v:(v,u)∈E(H)
fuv + ∑
v:(v,u)∈F
guv ∀u ∈ H
guv ≤ pB ∀eB = (u, v) ∈ F
fuv ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E(H)
guv ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ F
(DP)
We will interpret (DP) as solving a maximum circulation problem in the following network N: It
has three sets of edges, {(s, t)}, E(H) and F. The edges in E(H) are of infinite capacity and the
flow on e ∈ E(H) is denoted by f e. F contains edges with capacity p, and the flow on e ∈ F is
denoted by ge. The goal is to push the maximum amount of flow from t to s through E(H) ∪ F
and then back from s to t on edge (s, t) of infinite capacity.
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Lemma 12. (LP) always has an integral optimal solution and there is a combinatorial polynomial time
algorithm for solving it.
Proof. First, remove edge st from the above described network and find a maximum flow from
t to s and denote it by f , g. Obtain the residual graph, which clearly will not have any paths
from t to s. Let R be the set of vertices reachable from t using residual edges. Construct (x, y) as
follows:
yu =
{
1 if u ∈ R
0 otherwise
xB = min{yρBout − yρBin
, 0}
Clearly, (x, y) is integral. Moreover, (x, y) and (f , g) satisfy complementarity:
• xB(guv − pB) = 0 for all eB = (u, v) ∈ F.
• fuv(yu − yv) = 0 for all (u, v) ∈ E(H).
• guv(yu − yv − xB) = 0 for all eB = (u, v) ∈ F.
Hence, (x, y) is an integral optimal solution for (LP).
Remark. Notice that we formulated the IP for robust stable matching as a minimization problem,
i.e, minimizing the probability that the matching M is in MAB. The reason is that this involves
testing only whether S crosses the edge (ρBout, ρ
B
in). On the other hand, checking whether M is in
MA ∩MB involves testing two edges in general, i.e, that S crosses (t, ρ
B
out) or (ρ
B
in, s). The latter
would not have led to a linear IP.
Remark. We can now explain why downward shifts are much more difficult to deal with. Ob-
serve that the guarantee that there is at most one rotation, ρin, that leads from MA ∩MB to
MAB and at most one rotation, ρout that leads from MAB to MA ∩MB is crucial for forming
the IP and showing that its LP-relaxation always has integral an integral solution. For the case
of downward shifts, there may be more than one rotation that lead fromMA ∩MB toMAB and
fromMAB toMA ∩MB. Although we can still formulate an IP for this case, its LP-relaxation is
not guaranteed to have an integral solution.
4.1 Extending to incomplete preference lists
Finally, we show how to extend our algorithm to the generalization of stable matching to in-
complete preference lists. It is well known that the set of unmatched agents remain unchanged
under all stable matchings in this case, e.g., see [GI89]. Let A be the given instance and let B be
obtained by executing an upward shift on one agent’s list. If the set of unmatched agents under
B is not the same as under A, then MA ∩MB = ∅ and we can ignore B. Otherwise, the sets of
stable matchings in A and B are defined over the same subset of the agents and all our results
carry over.
The first part of Theorem 1 now follows from Lemmas 11 and 12.
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5 Succinct Representation for the Sublattice of Robust Stable Match-
ings
We first prove that the set of robust stable matchings forms a sublattice of the lattice of all stable
matchings of the given instance. We then use our combinatorial solution of (DP) to show how to
obtain a succinct structure that helps generate all matchings from this sublattice.
Lemma 13. The set of robust stable matchings to instance A under probability distribution p forms a
sublattice of LA.
Proof. Let M1 and M2 be two robust stable matchings and let S1 and S2 be the corresponding
closed subsets. It suffices to show that the matchings generated by S1 ∪ S2 and S2 ∩ S2 are also
robust. We say that a closed subset S separates and edge (ρBout, ρ
B
in) in E if ρ
B
out 6∈ S and ρ
B
in ∈ S.
Divide the edges in F into 5 sets as follows:
1. F1 is the set of edges in F from V \ (S1 ∪ S2) to S1 ∩ S2.
2. F2 is the set of edges in F from S1 \ S2 to S1 ∩ S2.
3. F3 is the set of edges in F from S2 \ S1 to S1 ∩ S2.
4. F4 is the set of edges in F from V \ (S1 ∪ S2) to S1 \ S2.
5. F5 is the set of edges in F from V \ (S1 ∪ S2) to S2 \ S1.
Let Pi = ∑eB∈Fi pB for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Since M1 and M2 are robust stable matchings, the objectives
obtained by S1 and S2 in (IP) are equal:
∑
S1 separates eB
pB = ∑
S2 separates eB
pB
Therefore,
P1 + P2 + P5 = P1 + P3 + P4
P2 + P5 = P3 + P4.
We will show that P2 = P4 and P3 = P5. Assume without loss of generality that P2 > P4 and
P3 > P5. Then
P1 + P2 + P3 > P1 + P2 + P5.
In other words, the objective of (IP) obtained by S1 ∩ S2 is smaller than the one obtained by S1.
This contradicts the fact that M1 is robust stable matching. Therefore, P2 = P4 and P3 = P5 as
desired.
It follows that P1 + P2 + P3 and P1 + P4 + P5 also attain the minimum value of the objective
function of (IP). Hence, the matchings generated by S1 ∪ S2 and S2 ∩ S2 are also robust.
By Lemma 13, the set of robust stable matchings is a sublattice, say L0, of LA. By Birkhoff’s
Theorem [B+37] we know that there is a partial order, say Π0, whose closed sets are isomorphic
to L0. Next, we show how to construct Π0 using our combinatorial solution for (DP).
14
As in Lemma 12, remove edge st from network N described above and find a maximum flow
from t to s and denote it by f , g. Obtain the residual graph, say G. The strongly connected
components of G are the elements of Π0. Contracting the strongly connected components of G
yields a DAG D, which gives the precedence relations in Π0. To be precise, x ≺ y in Π0 if and
only if there is a path from x to y in D.
Lemma 14. The closed sets of partial order Π0 correspond exactly to robust stable matchings.
Proof. Let S be a closed set in Π0. There are no edges in the residual graph that go from S to S.
Hence all edges in the cut (S, S) are fully saturated and therefore this cut minimizes the objective
function of (IP). Hence the corresponding matching is a robust stable matching. The reverse
direction is straightforward.
Recall that if Π is the rotation poset for lattice LA, then the matching corresponding to any
closed set S in Π is obtained by starting from the boy-optimal matching in LA and applying all
rotations in S in any order consistent with a topological sort of Π. In [MV18] we show that the
corresponding process for finding the matching in L0 corresponding to a closed set S of Π0 is
the following: The elements of S are sets of rotations. Let U be the union of all these sets. Now
starting from the boy-optimal matching in LA, apply all rotations in U in any order consistent
with a topological sort of Π. This yields the matching in L0 corresponding to set S. Hence we
get.
Lemma 15. Π0 generates the sublattice L0 of robust stable matchings.
The second part of Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas 13 and 15.
6 Discussion
As stated in the Introduction, the two main questions on stable matching considered in this paper
are obtaining efficient algorithms for finding solutions that are robust to errors in the input, and
the structural question of finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two “nearby”
instances. The current paper and our followup work [MV18] seem to suggest that both these
issues are likely to lead to much work in the future. In particular, the structural results are
so clean and extensive that they are likely to find algorithmic applications beyond the problem
of finding robust solutions. One possible domain of applications that may be able to exploit
these structural properties is matching-based markets, particularly as we are seeing ever more
interesting such markets being designed and launched on the Internet, e.g., see [Rot16].
At a more detailed level, we have left the open problem of dealing with downward shifts. The
domain D, for which we have obtained our algorithm, is very restrictive and we need to extend
it to a larger domain. Our followup paper [MV18] partially does this, though it works with a
weaker notion of “robust”. It seems more should be doable; in particular, what happens if two
or more errors are introduced simultaneously?
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Beyond these questions, pertaining to the most basic of formulations of stable matching, one can
study numerous variants and generalizations, e.g., the stable roommates problem, and matching
intern couples to hospitals. Each of these bring their own structural properties and challenges,
e.g., see [GI89, Man13].
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